The inception of the emission trading scheme in Europe has contributed to power price increases. Energy intensive industries have reacted by arguing that this may affect their competitiveness and will induce them to leave Europe. Taking up a proposal of these industrial sectors, we explore the possible application of special contracts, where electricity is sold at average generation cost to mitigate the impact of CO 2 cost on power prices. The model supposes fixed generation capacities. We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all consumers (industries and the rest of the market) are price-takers and buy electricity at short-run marginal cost. We then change the market design by assuming that energy intensive industries pay power either at a regional or at a zonal average cost price. The analysis is conducted with simulation models applied to the Central Western European power market. The models are implemented in GAMS/PATH.
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Introduction
The European Union introduced its emission trading scheme (EU-ETS) in January 2005 with the view of curbing CO 2 emissions and hence contributing to mitigate climate change. The degradation of the competitiveness of part of the European electricity intensive industries (EIIs) is progressively emerging as an unintended but possible consequence of this combination of the EU-ETS with the restructuring of the electricity sector. The negative impact of the ETS on EIIs is twofold: industries need not only abate emissions (direct impact); they also face a higher electricity price (indirect impact). This second, apparently unexpected, effect results from the power sector passing CO 2 (opportunity) costs into electricity prices in a competitive market. 1 EIIs can adapt to these cost increases by accepting lower profits or increasing their product prices. They explain that this endangers their competitiveness on international markets. Some studies (e.g., Demailly and Quirion 2006; McKinsey and Ecofys 2006; Reinaud 2005) show that the industrial sectors' exposure to the EU-ETS depends on (1) the industry's ability to pass the extra carbon cost to consumers, (2) the international trade openness, (3) the energy intensity and the possibility to abate carbon and, last, (4) the allowance allocation method. 2 These factors vary with the industrial sector considered. EIIs further argue that this cost increase will eventually force some of them to move part of their production activities to extra-Community countries where emission policies are less restrictive. This may entail a serious loss of welfare for the European countries with no global environmental gain. CO 2 emissions will simply be displaced or more likely increased because the relocated EIIs' plants will connect to less efficient electricity systems. This phenomenon is known as carbon leakage. 3 EIIs have responded to this challenge by various proposals: one of them is to change the mechanism adopted to price electricity. Specifically, they ask for long-term contracts whereby they can procure electricity at average instead of marginal cost. This pricing principle underlies the formation of the Exeltium consortium in France where a number of electro-intensive industries managed to conclude long term contracts with generators at a national cost based price. Long term competitiveness and price stability are the arguments invoked to justify these contracts. The underlying principle of these contracts is for generators to reserve part of their power plants for EIIs and apply to them a price computed as the average capacity, fuel and emission costs of these dedicated units.
In this paper, we test the extent to which these special contracts would heal the ETS burdens on industries and hence reduce the leakage effect. We illustrate this issue by
